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Lesson-learning not Blame: Realistic or Optimistic? 
By Rob Heaton and Steve Tong. 
Introduction 
The British model of policing has been based on local accountability, community engagement to 
activate the community in presenting and responding to crime and enhance confidence and 
legitimacy. At the same time the dual roles of policing of reassurance and law enforcement reflects 
two contradictory roles of support and problem solving through to targeting and use of coercion. 
Measures of public confidence have become more important in measuring police performance. 
However, criticisms of an ineffective complaints process pointing to early retirements of police 
officers, lacking independence in investigating police misconduct and wrong doing and a lack of public 
trust in the system has resulted in reform with the introduction of the IPCC (now the IOPC) and 
significant changes to regulation. Despite these changes the police still investigate a large proportion 
of complaints against them, a high proportion of unproven misconduct cases remain and criticisms 
remain about the effectiveness of the police complaints system. 
Recent years have seen widespread acceptance within police and political circles, that the complaints 
system is, if not broken, at the least in need of reform. The subject was addressed by the Home Affairs 
Select Committee ‘Policing for the Future’ report, published in October 2018. The various 
contributions of the Police Federation, Police Superintendents’ Association and National Police Chiefs’ 
Council were united in advocating a less personal blame-seeking approach, in order to promote the 
learning of lessons and service improvement. In one important respect, the police appeared to be 
pushing at a recently-opened door. The Director General of the newly-formed Independent Office for 
Police Conduct (IOPC), Michael Lockwood, had told the Federation in May that he supported the use 
of genuine mistakes as opportunities to learn, with disciplinary sanctions being reserved for the most 
serious cases. In June, a Police Foundation/KPMG report ‘How do we move from a blame culture to a 
learning culture in policing?’ addressed the topic. Contributed to by representatives of the police, 
academia, police scrutiny bodies and others, the report made several recommendations aimed at 
fostering learning from mistakes. 
This show of unanimity was overtaken by events. It was reported in October that proposed 
amendments to Police Regulations, including the redefinition of misconduct and gross misconduct, 
had been shelved indefinitely due to governmental Brexit pressures. The aim of this article is to assess 
how realistic the aim of replacing a negative culpability-seeking culture with a more positive 
alternative, might be. Does the grass merely seem to be greener on the other side of the fence?  It is 
suggested that that a ‘lesson learning’ model has inherent difficulties which are seldom articulated, 
and lacks an evidence base which could be addressed by means of targeted research. 
Complaints - Some Context 
The ambition of lesson-learning is not so much new, as a long-repeated theme. Current disciplinary 
procedures are prescribed by the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012. The 
accompanying Home Office Circular 23/12 states that ‘The procedures are intended to encourage a 
culture of learning and development for individuals and/ or the organisation’ (Para 2.3). Identical 
aspirations were expressed in relation to the earlier Police (Conduct) Regulations 2008 and the Police 
(Conduct) Regulations 2004. The implication is that in practice this encouragement has failed, 
although the reasons are unclear. 
IOPC figures provide a sense of the scale of the complaints system. The last decade has seen a fairly 
steady rate of 30-35,000 complaints against police per year. Although the figure may appear 
substantial, it amounts on average to fewer than three complaints per force, per day or put another 
way, about one complaint per officer, every four years. Moreover, the proportion of ‘neglect of duty’ 
allegations has risen from 19% of the total in 2004-5, to 39% in 2015-16. The complaints landscape is 
increasingly dominated by concerns which amount not so much to police acting badly, as failures to 
meet rising public aspirations. 
As Peter Waddington reminds us, policing is in large part about the exercise of authority with the aim 
of achieving order and provisional solutions in a plethora of situations. Arrests alone amount to over 
1 million per year in England and Wales, illustrating that policing is in large part, inevitably 
confrontational and contentious within an adversarial system. In the context of a fractious and non-
deferential world, the number of complaints may be viewed as surprisingly low. 
In common with disciplinary processes in other professions and the criminal justice system, a key 
problem of the complaints system is its effects upon individuals in an already stressed workplace. The 
Superintendents’ submission to the Select Committee pointed to ‘lengthy and costly investigations 
which are often entirely disproportionate to the original issues or behaviour complained of’. The 
investigations averaged 8-12 months, against the backdrop that in a recent resilience survey, half of 
its members had reported anxiety symptoms whilst a quarter exhibited signs of depression. These 
concerns about excessive timescales and disproportionality were echoed in a 2016 Federation 
members’ survey into demand and welfare. 
Causes of Disproportionality 
Two related factors drive maximal investigations: accountability and risk aversion. The recent 
consultations around the subject have produced strong responses that whilst reflex blame-seeking 
should be avoided, clear cases of disciplinary breaches should be dealt with firmly. The likelihood is 
also that disciplinary decision-makers would wish to avoid any perception of an ambiguous stance 
towards standards and probity. The consequence of this risk aversion is clearly seen in the PSAEW’s 
submission to the Select Committee in respect of the 38 complaints against its members in 2015.  
Again, the context is that these are not common events, amounting to fewer than one complaint 
against a superintendent per police force, per year. Nonetheless, there appears to be a case for some 
reform. We might reasonably expect that as in criminal matters ranging from speeding to assaults, the 
greatest number of cases would be at the lower end of seriousness. In the event, 26 of the 38 cases 
were assessed as being of gross misconduct – potentially dismissable matters. The perception of this 
finding as routine preliminary ‘overcharging’ is strengthened by the outcome that of the 22 cases 
resolved by the end of the year, 16 saw no further action and just one dismissal had taken place.  
This approach appears to be at odds with the Home Office guidance on police officer misconduct: 
- ‘The investigation into the complaint must be proportionate having regard to the nature of 
the allegation and any likely outcome’ (Para. 2.46) 
- ‘Assessments of conduct which are unnecessarily severe serve only to undermine an 
investigation, or increase any perception of unfairness on the part of an officer subject of 
investigation’ (Para 2.129). 
The guidance also makes it clear that initial assessments can be properly revised upwards or 
downwards at a later stage. 
It is not clear whether ‘overcharging’ occurs routinely in relation to the bulk of cases which affect 
lower ranks. Research would be required in order to establish whether this is the case.  
 
Learning not Blame? Some Challenges 
Can the seriousness of an allegation be accurately assessed from the outset? 
The culture of the police complaints system is sometimes compared unfavourably with that in the 
aviation industry, where ‘near misses’ in flight are said to be treated as learning experiences. In reality, 
this is hardly a valid comparison. The aviation examples relate to the interaction between a person 
and a mechanical system or a closely-prescribed set of procedures. There is no complainant and 
transgressions are relatively clear. 
In contrast, police complaints normally relate to interactions between two or more human beings, 
who may have completely different perceptions of the same set of events. ‘Confirmation’ or ‘myside’ 
bias means that opinions readily become entrenched. A more realistic comparison with the aviation 
industry might be passenger perceptions of their treatment in the event of airport disruption. 
In the policing sphere, a recent example of the difficulty of complaint categorisation, was provided by 
a recent IOPC report. In summary, a custody officer struck a violent detainee on an arm, to encourage 
its withdrawal from a cell flap. The officer was charged with assault and found guilty at court, but 
cleared on appeal. A subsequent disciplinary tribunal found that the use of force was proportionate 
and necessary. Different interpretations of the evidence reached very different conclusions. 
Could an effective ‘learning from mistakes’ system be implemented? 
No organisation could assimilate even a small fraction of lessons which might be learned from several 
thousand complaints, per year. Moreover, many complaints may relate to an individual complainant-
officer interaction, producing little by way of transferable learning. This raises the question of how 
successful a learning model for individual officers might be. 
Can ‘mistakes’ be readily identified? 
Officers are sometimes described as ‘overly defensive’ in relation to their actions. However, 
defensiveness does not imply wrongdoing, nor that in a less adversarial system, they might for 
example, apologise and agree to modify their behaviour. The most obvious reason for defensive 
reactions is that officers simply do not believe that their actions were wrong, and are liable to the 
same confirmation bias as anyone else. The extent of officer unwillingness to take part in lesson-
learning is unclear, but it is potentially a substantial barrier. According to the IOPC, 42 per cent of 
complaints were dealt with by way of local resolution in 2016-17. This extent of this method of disposal 
means that there is potentially a significant proportion of ‘agreements to disagree’ although research 
would be required to confirm this or otherwise. The majority of investigated complaints are not 
substantiated and this provides an additional pool of potential unwillingness to engage with a lesson 
learning process. 
Would there be public acceptance of moving away from a ‘blame culture?’ 
This question was discussed by contributors to the Police Foundation/KPMG report in June 2018. No 
definitive conclusion was achieved. The point was made that a key part of the police role is to identify 
transgressors and hold them to account. It is not surprising that a similar mentality applies to internal 
transgressions. Not to do so, might seem to amount to an inconsistency of accountability standards. 
In general, public expectation was considered to be poorly understood and not necessarily equivalent 
to journalistic hyperbole. 
Frank Furedi has written about how society has become obsessed with risk aversion, with the media 
and politicians identified as key risk-mongers. The has led to a blame culture where trust in authority 
is scarce and people’s thinking is dominated by complaints and litigation. According to Furedi, even 
natural disasters see finger-pointing and the attribution of blame. If this perspective is even part-
correct, there is some consistency between media and public perceptions. The current public reflex of 
searching for blame in the name of accountability, may be very difficult to negate. 
Some Conclusions 
In September 2017, the North Yorkshire PCC Julia Mulligan described the police complaints system as 
‘largely broken’, failing both the public and the workforce. This diagnosis echoed concerns expressed 
within and outside the service, but appears to be overstated. Complaints handling is an arena where 
popularity is not synonymous with effectiveness and it is easier to identify problems than answers. 
Although officers are undoubtedly concerned about attracting complaints, they are on average, 
actually subject of complaints fairly seldom. A key aim of any system of accountability and sanctions 
is deterrence, and the system seems to be relatively effective in this respect. Moreover, it deals with 
highly contentious interactions where the protagonists may have opposing viewpoints and where no 
independent and objective evidence exists. Overall, the complaints environment is one which is 
unlikely to achieve high satisfaction ratings and its achievements may be under-appreciated.  
A wholesale move to a mainly lesson-learning approach is likely to encounter resistance from the 
public and certainly from a combative media. Greater readiness to accept of error in contested cases 
might trigger more civil claims and undermine public perceptions of officers’ authority.  
The nature of police disquiet about the complaints system also gives rise to questions about the need 
for radical reform. The main perceived problems are of disproportionality and excessive timescales. 
Existing Home Office guidance stresses the importance of proportionality and timescales are 
substantially within police control, but these levers appear to be trumped by risk aversion, perhaps in 
the face of ambiguous circumstances. Moreover, lesson learning is already encouraged and it is 
unclear whether a move in this direction under a different complaints regime, would be substantial or 
marginal. Risk aversion generates considerable inertia against change. Further inertia is added by the 
large aggregate number of complaints and their contested nature. The current system which is able 
to accommodate disagreement, albeit to the limited satisfaction of the parties involved. A lesson-
learning system might find considerably difficulty in accommodating these problems. 
New legislation to encourage a move towards lesson-learning in place of individual blame is to be 
welcomed. However, the answers to some of the problems of the current system lie in the police’s 
own hands and it is not apparent that the service is ready to capitalise fully upon renewed regulations. 
The delay in implementation gives the service an opportunity to debate the nature of a lesson-learning 
system and how it would merge with current practice. New approaches towards risk-averse decision 
making and the implementation of lesson-learning need not necessarily wait for legislation. 
Experience suggests that if and when it is enacted, police commentators may still find themselves 
revisiting the subject a decade later. 
 
